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LESS THAN ZERO?
By Carlos Manuel Vázquez*
Medellı́n v. Texas 1 is the first case in which the Supreme Court has denied a treaty-based
claim solely on the ground that the treaty relied upon was non-self-executing. In Foster v. Neilson,2 the only other case in which the Court had denied relief on this ground,3 the Court offered
its view that the treaty was non-self-executing as an alternative ground for denying relief.4 The
Court soon thereafter disavowed its conclusion that the treaty involved in Foster was non-selfexecuting,5 and, in the intervening years, it repeatedly declined invitations to deny relief on this
or related grounds.6 Many observers (including me) thought that the Court would again skirt
a ruling on non-self-execution in Medellı́n because the president had issued a memorandum
ordering compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Avena.7
After all, the Court in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi had recently struck down a California law on the ground that it conflicted with a “policy” reflected in certain sole executive
agreements.8 The president in Medellı́n seemed to be standing on stronger ground, as he was
insisting that state law give way to an obligation imposed by a treaty that had received the
consent of the Senate and was accordingly the supreme law of the land.9 But the Court defied
this expectation, with potentially regrettable results for the law of treaties.
My comments here will focus on the path the Court might have taken to avoid a selfexecution holding. Bush’s memorandum ordering compliance with the Avena judgment bears
* Of the Board of Editors.
1
128 S.Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008).
2
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
3
Id. at 314. In his dissent in Medellı́n, Justice Breyer noted that Foster and Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville,
227 U.S. 39 (1913), were the only cases in which the Supreme Court had denied relief on this ground. Medellı́n,
128 S.Ct. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AJIL 695, 716 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, Four Doctrines]). The majority did not dispute the point. 128
S.Ct. at 1366 n.12. In the article cited by the dissent for this point, I noted, out of an excess of caution, that Cameron
Septic Tank may have denied relief on non-self-execution grounds, but, if so, it was ambiguous in doing so. Vázquez,
Four Doctrines, supra, at 716 n.96. I now do not regard Cameron Septic Tank as having based its holding on a conclusion that the treaty was non-self-executing. See Brief for Louis Henkin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16 n.10, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) (“[In Cameron,] this Court noted but
did not endorse the apparent view of Congress . . . that the treaty of Brussels of 1900 was not self-executing. Instead,
it ruled against the plaintiff on the merits . . . .”) (I was a coauthor of this brief).
4
See generally Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of
Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151 (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson, & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007)
[hereinafter Vázquez, Story of Foster and Percheman].
5
United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
6
Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 627 (2006), with Brief for the Respondents at 31, Hamdan, 548
U.S. 557 (No. 05-184) (arguing that treaties are presumptively to be enforced diplomatically rather than judicially);
compare Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 179 (1993) (construing Article 33 of Refugee Convention not to apply to aliens beyond U.S. borders), with Brief for the Petitioners at 38 n.24, Sale, 509 U.S. 155
(No. 92-344) (arguing that Article 33 is not judicially enforceable); compare United States v. Alvarez–Machain, 504
U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (construing U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty not to prohibit unilateral abductions), with Brief
for United States at 34, Alvarez–Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (No. 91-712) (arguing that individuals lack standing to
invoke extradition treaty in court).
7
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ REP. 12 (Mar. 31).
8
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003).
9
I refer here to Article 94 of the United Nations Charter [hereinafter Article 94], by which the United States
undertook to comply with judgments of the ICJ in cases to which it is a party.
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some resemblance to a proposal I made in these pages a decade ago10 when the ICJ ordered the
United States to stay the execution of Angel Breard pending resolution of the proceeding
brought by Paraguay on his behalf at the ICJ.11 Given the failure of Bush’s memorandum to
garner a single vote in Medellı́n, it seems fitting to revisit the issue. As discussed below, the
majority’s reasons for rejecting the president’s action rest on its idiosyncratic and countertextual views about what it means for a treaty to be non-self-executing. As a result, the majority’s
analysis of the president’s memorandum in Medellı́n tells us little about the president’s power
to displace state law to promote foreign policy interests unrelated to non-self-executing treaties.
(The majority itself disclaimed broad implications for its presidential power holding by inserting a this-day-and-train-only footnote12 reminiscent of its similar disclaimer in Bush v. Gore.13)
But the majority’s analysis of the presidential power issue offers some basis for resolving some
ambiguities in the Court’s analysis of the self-execution issue: interpreting the majority’s nonself-execution holding narrowly is the only way to avoid reducing the majority’s presidential
power analysis to absurdity.
I. PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN BREARD
When the ICJ issued an order of provisional measures in Paraguay v. United States, requiring
a stay of Virginia’s execution of Angel Breard, the solicitor general took the position that,
under our Constitution, the responsibility for deciding whether to comply with the ICJ’s order
rested with the governor of Virginia.14 It seemed clear to me at the time that the solicitor general’s position was untenable. One of the principal reasons for the adoption of a new Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation was the states’ repeated violations of treaty obligations during the period before the Constitution, which resulted in serious foreign relations problems
for the fledgling nation. The founders were unanimous in believing that the new Constitution had
to place responsibility for treaty compliance in the hands of the federal government.15
The real question in Breard was not whether the federal government had the power to
require compliance with the ICJ’s order but, rather, whether the power rested with the
judicial, executive, or legislative branches. The answer to that question was complicated
by the uncertainty that existed at the time about whether ICJ orders of provisional measures were binding as a matter of international law. The ICJ later held that such orders are
binding,16 but at the time of Breard, the United States took the position that they were
10
See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional
Measures, 92 AJIL 683, 689 –90 (1998) [hereinafter Vázquez, Breard and Federal Power].
11
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 ICJ REP. 248, 258 (Nov. 10) (“The United
States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final
decision in these proceedings.”).
12
The Medellı́n majority denied that it was holding that “in the exercise of his Article II powers pursuant to a ratified
treaty, the President can never take action that would result in setting aside state law,” 128 S.Ct. at 1367 n.13, and it
stressed that it was addressing only the “far more limited [questions] of whether he may unilaterally create federal law by
giving effect to the judgment of this international tribunal pursuant to this non-self-executing treaty, and, if not, whether
he may rely on other authority under the Constitution to support the action taken in this particular case.” Id.
13
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (limiting consideration “to the present circumstances”).
14
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214).
15
See generally Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 3, at 698 –700; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights
and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1108 –10 (1992).
16
LaGrand (FRG v. U.S.), 2001 ICJ REP. 446 ( June 27).
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not.17 I argued that, even assuming that ICJ orders of provisional measures were not binding as a matter of international law, and for that reason were not directly enforceable in
our courts, an act of the legislature was not needed: the president had the power to issue
an executive order requiring Virginia to comply with the ICJ’s order.18 After all, the
United States was party to one treaty submitting the case to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ and another that gave the ICJ the authority to issue orders of provisional measures. Under the Supremacy Clause, those treaties were the supreme law of the land, and,
under Article II, the president had the duty to take care that they were faithfully executed.
Even if ICJ orders of provisional measures were not binding under international law (and
for that reason not directly enforceable in our courts), the treaties contemplated that parties would generally comply. It was thus reasonable, I argued, to construe the treaties as
implicitly delegating to the president the authority to require compliance.19 Because provisional measures orders are by their nature provisional, their effect on individual liberty
or on the prerogative of the states would be temporary. More important, provisional measures are by their nature emergency measures.20 Thus, holding that compliance with those
orders must await legislative action would render the treaty’s authorization of those orders
completely inefficacious given the significant obstacles to federal legislation built into our
constitutional system.21
II. THE PRESIDENT’S MEMORANDUM IN MEDELLÍN
Fast forward to 2005, after the ICJ’s judgment in Avena.22 Because Avena was a concededly
binding final judgment, the case for direct judicial enforcement was stronger than in Breard,
as a third treaty—the United Nations Charter— obligates parties to comply with ICJ final
17

Brief for the United States, supra note 14, at 51; LaGrand at 507– 08, paras. 112, 115.
Vázquez, Breard and Federal Power, supra note 10, at 685– 86.
19
Although I also suggested that the president’s power to “Take Care” that the relevant treaties be faithfully executed would have supported a presidential order to comply with a (hypothetically) binding order of provisional measures even if it were regarded as not directly enforceable for political question reasons, see Vázquez, Breard and Federal Power, supra note 10, at 685, I regarded the delegation rationale as narrower and sufficient to sustain an executive
order staying Breard’s execution. For a careful and persuasive argument that the president’s memorandum in Medellı́n was a valid exercise of his “Take Care” power, see Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 331, 372– 86 (2008). Although Swaine argues that a “Take Care” rationale would be narrower than a delegation rationale, id. at 377, he does not seem to be referring to the delegation argument discussed here and in my
prior article, which was specific to orders of provisional measures. His article discusses the validity of the president’s
order requiring compliance with the final judgment in Avena. Id. at 337– 42. As discussed below, my delegation
argument would not necessarily apply to such an order.
20
Bernard H. Oxman, Jurisdiction and the Power to Indicate Provisional Measures, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 323, 323 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987) (“Urgency is a basic characteristic
of those situations.”).
21
See Vázquez, Breard and Federal Power, supra note 10, at 689 & n.37. Of course, the treaty authorizing such
measures does not say expressly that it delegates such power to the president. Treaties generally do not address details
of domestic enforcement (nor can they, given the diversity of constitutional systems covered by multilateral treaties
of this sort). My argument was that treaties authorizing emergency measures of this sort should be construed as
implicitly authorizing action by domestic officials who have the ability to act expeditiously and who otherwise can
be delegated power to perform the contemplated acts. See id. at 689 n.37. In countries with a more streamlined
legislative process, compliance through legislation might be appropriate, but in a legal system such as ours, which
imposes significant obstacles to legislation, executive action is necessary.
22
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ REP. 12 (Mar. 31).
18
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judgments against them.23 In Medellı́n, the Bush administration argued that the ICJ judgment
was not directly enforceable in court,24 but it concluded that the president had the power to
require the states to comply; the president accordingly issued what he called a “memorandum,”
effectively requiring the state courts to provide the hearings called for by the Avena judgment.25
Some commentators believed that the case for a presidential order requiring state compliance was stronger in Medellı́n than in Breard because the former involved a concededly binding
final judgment. In my view, the constitutional case for Bush’s order is, if anything, slightly
weaker. An order requiring compliance with a final judgment cannot be characterized as a temporary measure. Had the hearing required by Avena been held, and the requisite prejudice been
found, the state court would presumably have been required to order an effective remedy, such
as a new trial or a new sentence for Medellı́n. More important, unlike provisional measures,
final judgments are not necessarily emergency measures. Thus, awaiting action by Congress
would not completely gut the treaty provisions authorizing such judgments and requiring
compliance. The solicitor general in Medellı́n made an argument along the lines of my defense
of a Breard executive order, noting that compliance might often require swift action.26 This
argument might support the conclusion that the president has the power to order compliance
with final judgments in certain situations, but, if this were the only basis for upholding presidential power, it might be countered that the president should only have the power to maintain the status quo for the time necessary to give Congress a chance to consider the matter. By
contrast, provisional measures will always be temporary emergency measures, so it is reasonable
to interpret the treaty authorizing such measures to grant the president the power to require
full compliance.
In the end, the strength of the argument for a presidential power to require compliance with
an international tribunal’s judgment depends on the reasons for concluding that the judgment
is not directly enforceable in the courts. If Article 94 had provided that the states parties agreed
to take action through their legislatures to comply with any judgment against them rendered by
the ICJ, then the treaty would clearly have contemplated action by Congress. The treaty would
have been a “stipulation for a future legislative act,” which is what the Court in United States
v. Percheman regarded as the archetype of a non-self-executing treaty.27 Critics of President
Bush’s memorandum worried that, if the president were recognized to have the power to
require compliance with ICJ orders pursuant to Article 94, he would have the power to execute
any non-self-executing treaty.28 That would certainly be a very broad power, given the broad
scope of existing human rights treaties that have been deemed non-self-executing.29 But
23
The Spanish version of UN Charter Article 94 indicates that the parties “agree[d] to comply” with the judgments of the ICJ. See Medellı́n, 128 S.Ct. at 1384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Spanish counterpart to “undertakes to comply”—“compromete a cumplir”—which translates most directly as “agrees to comply”).
24
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent 33–38, Medellı́n v. Dretke, 544 U.S.
660 (2005) (No. 04-5928).
25
George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), reprinted in John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 99 AJIL 489 (2005).
26
Supra note 24, at 45– 46; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23–24, Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
27
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 – 89 (1833).
28
Brief of Constitutional and International Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 11–12,
Medellı́n, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
29
These treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS
171, 6 ILM 368; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
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upholding the president’s memorandum need not have had such broad ramifications. To paraphrase the Medellı́n majority, some treaties delegate power to the president and some do not,
depending on the treaty.30 If the human rights treaties are indeed non-self-executing, it is
because they were so declared by the United States through “declarations” appended to the
instruments of ratification.31 Whether these treaties confer execution power on the president
thus depends on whether the declarations of non-self-execution can be so construed. In my
view, these declarations are best read to require legislation.32
Article 94 contains no express or even implied requirement of legislative action. The article
provides that each party “undertakes” or “agrees”33 to comply with ICJ judgments. The
Supremacy Clause gives that obligation the force of supreme federal law and instructs state
courts to give it effect, notwithstanding the laws of the states. In the absence of some constitutional impediment to judicial implementation, the Court should have concluded that the
Avena judgment was directly enforceable by virtue of Article 94 and the Supremacy Clause, as
the dissenters argued. A constitutional impediment to direct judicial enforcement of an ICJ
judgment might have existed, for example, if the judgment had required the appropriation of
money34 or the criminalization of conduct.35 The Due Process Clause would have been an
additional impediment to the direct judicial enforcement of a hypothetical ICJ judgment
requiring that state officials who had violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention be imprisoned.36 Separation-of-powers problems of a “political question” sort might impede direct judicial enforcement of ICJ judgments in politically charged cases, such as the case the United
States lost to Nicaragua in the 1980s.37
Nothing in the Constitution impedes the courts from affording the hearing that the ICJ
called for in Avena. I had thus thought that, if the Avena judgment were to be found not to be
directly enforceable in the courts, it would have been on the basis of a different sort of constitutional concern—a concern that giving legal effect to such judgments would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to international tribunals. Unlike a treaty that
1965, GA Res. 2106 (XX), 660 UNTS 195; and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 UNTS 85.
30
Cf. Medellı́n, 128 S.Ct. at 1365 (“[S]ome treaties are self-executing and some are not, depending on the
treaty.”).
31
See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, available at ⬍http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽1118063⬎, revised in 121 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008) (manuscript at 48 –75) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties as Law].
32
See id. at 70 –75.
33
As noted by the dissent, the equally authoritative Spanish version provided that the parties “agreed” to comply
with ICJ judgments. See supra note 23.
34
See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 3, at 718 –19.
35
See id.
36
This was one of the hypotheticals posed by Chief Justice John Roberts at the Medellı́n oral argument, apparently to raise concerns about an interpretation of Article 94 requiring compliance with ICJ judgments without
exception. Transcript of Record at 4, Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984). In addition to the
due process problem with any attempt at direct judicial enforcement of such a (highly unlikely) ICJ judgment, it
is worth noting that enforcement could in any case be precluded through a subsequent federal statute forbidding
compliance.
37
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ REP. 14 ( June 27).
But cf. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting “political
question” rationale for dismissing action seeking to enforce ICJ Nicaragua judgment, but dismissing on other
grounds).
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imposes determinate obligations on the United States, a treaty agreeing to comply with judgments of an international tribunal imposes commitments that are not fully known at the time
of ratification. Scholars have suggested that such commitments may constitute unconstitutional delegations of legislative power and that the constitutional solution is to regard such
judgments as non-self-executing under domestic law.38 If this had been the reason for concluding that the Avena judgment was not directly enforceable, however, the constitutional problem
would be resolved by treating the judgment as enforceable if the president so orders. There
would clearly be no constitutional problem with an express delegation of such authority to the
president. It is well established that the limitations on Congress’s power to delegate authority to the
president, weak as they are in the domestic context, are even weaker in the international context.39
It is also well established that rule-making power can be delegated to the president by treaty.40 If
there is no constitutional impediment to a treaty’s delegating to the president the power to require
compliance with the judgments of international tribunals (assuming the judgments do not themselves raise constitutional problems) and if the only reason for finding the Avena judgment not to
be directly enforceable in court is a constitutionally based nondelegation concern, then the obvious
solution would be to regard the treaty as a delegation to the president of the authority to determine
whether to require compliance. Insisting on legislative action would compromise the goal of compliance considerably further than necessary to meet the constitutional concern.
In the end, the Medellı́n Court did not conclude that nondelegation principles impeded
direct judicial enforcement of the Avena judgment.41 Rather, the majority declared the Avena
judgment to be unenforceable for a reason that I had thought (and still believe) to be ruled out
by the plain text of the Constitution. It said that Article 94, though a valid treaty imposing
binding international obligations on the United States, lacks the force of domestic law.42 My
argument for a presidential power to require compliance with the Breard order was based, in
part, on the understanding that the order was authorized by treaties that, even if not directly
enforceable in the courts, were still the supreme law of the land. The argument for a presidential
power to require compliance with final ICJ judgments is similarly based on the understanding
that Article 94, even if not self-executing, is the law of the land. Thus, even if for some reason not
directly enforceable in court, the Article 94 obligation could operate as a delegation to the executive
of the power to require compliance. The question would be one of interpretation of the treaty (e.g.,
does it by its terms require legislative action?) or application of domestic separation-of-powers principles (e.g., is the obligation suitable for judicial enforcement?). The Court appeared to obviate any
38
Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1557, 1587–95 (2003).
39
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
40
See Vázquez, Breard and Federal Power, supra note 10, at 689 n.35.
41
Indeed, the Court appears to have rejected a delegation objection to an agreement to give domestic legal force
to the judgments of international tribunals. See 128 S.Ct. at 1364 – 65 (“We do not suggest that treaties can never
afford binding domestic effect to international tribunal judgments.”).
42
I share the view, noted elsewhere in this Agora, that the position that non-self-executing treaties lack domestic
law status would be difficult to reconcile with the text of the Supremacy Clause. See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AJIL 540, 550 (2008). For this reason, and for the additional reasons set forth below and in Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 31, Medellı́n should be read in a way that would
preserve the domestic law status of valid non-self-executing treaties. Notwithstanding the aspects of Medellı́n’s analysis that I discuss in the next several paragraphs, the majority opinion as a whole is susceptible to a narrower reading.
See generally Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 31.
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such inquiry by decreeing that the Constitution’s declaration that “all” treaties have the force of
domestic law does not apply to Article 94 and other non-self-executing treaties.43
If the treaty lacks the force of domestic law, the conclusion that an act of legislation is
required to displace otherwise applicable state law follows as a matter of course. An instrument
that lacks any force as domestic law cannot delegate any sort of authority to the president. As
the majority saw it, the president was claiming nothing short of the power to “create domestic
law.”44 Resolving the presidential power issue thus required no greater sophistication than that
of Justice Black’s opinion in Youngstown: “[T]he President’s power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”45
The glaring flaw in that analysis is, of course, the fact that the Constitution declares that all
treaties are domestic law. The majority appears to have drawn a negative inference from Foster’s
dictum that a treaty is “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”46 But, in Foster, Chief Justice Marshall did not say that only treaties that operate of themselves are to be
regarded by courts as equivalent to acts of the legislature. If one were nevertheless to draw a
negative inference from Marshall’s statement, it would be that only such treaties are equivalent
to legislative acts, not that only such treaties have the force of domestic law. And even if Marshall
(and the other Justices in Foster) had intended the negative inference that the majority drew in
Medellı́n, dicta in an alternative holding on an issue not briefed or argued,47 which were subsequently overruled and never since relied on by the Court as the basis for denying relief, are a slim
reed on which to rest a view so directly in conflict with the constitutional text. One hopes that the
majority will soon clarify that it did not mean to read treaties out of the Supremacy Clause. Otherwise, Medellı́n would provide grounds to suspect that even our most textualist Justices are, at best,
fair-weather textualists (which is to say, not textualists at all).
But the Court did not stop there. Its analysis suggests that it regarded non-self-executing
treaties as not just nonlaw, but as antilaw, their force as domestic law less than zero. In deciding
whether the president had the power to require the states to comply with the Avena judgment,
the majority applied Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite analysis from Youngstown.48 The
president’s power is at its apex when he is acting in accordance with the will of the legislature.
Had the majority acknowledged that Article 94 was domestic law, it might have concluded that
President Bush’s action fell within this first category, as the president was acting in accordance
with a law by which the nation agreed to comply with ICJ judgments. If Article 94 lacked the
force of domestic law, one might have expected the majority to place the president’s action in
Jackson’s middle, twilight category for conduct taken by the president in the face of legal
43
This analysis would appear to rule out presidential action requiring compliance with provisional measures
orders as well, if the obligation to comply with such measures (now recognized to be binding) derives from Article
94. Insofar as the obligation to comply with provisional measures orders derives from other treaty provisions, cf.
LaGrand (FRG v. U.S.), 2001 ICJ REP. 446, 505– 06 ( June 27) (noting that Article 94 “confirm[s] the binding
nature of provisional measures”), the president’s power to require compliance would turn, as a threshold matter,
on whether those treaty provisions are self-executing under the majority’s test.
44
Medellı́n v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1371 (2008).
45
Id. at 1369 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
46
Id. at 1356 (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).
47
See Vázquez, Story of Foster and Percheman, supra note 4, at 166 – 67.
48
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 –55 ( Jackson, J., concurring).
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silence. But the Court found that the existence of a non-self-executing treaty placed the president’s action in the third category, in which presidential power is at its weakest.49 In other
words, according to the majority, the president would have had greater power to require the
states to comply with the ICJ’s judgment if the United States had not ratified a treaty agreeing
to comply with the judgments of the ICJ!
The purported basis for this counterintuitive holding was the idea that “[a] non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to have
domestic effect of its own force.”50 The treaty thus reflects, in the majority’s view, “the implicit
understanding of the ratifying Senate” that implementing legislation was necessary.51 But,
according to the immediately preceding paragraph, the majority deemed Article 94 to be nonself-executing because it was “ratified without provisions clearly according it domestic effect.”
This is one of several statements in the opinion suggesting that the majority believed treaties
to be presumptively non-self-executing.52 If so, then the need for legislative implementation
resulted from the absence of affirmative evidence that the treaty was intended to have domestic
effect— evidence that the president and the Senate might have been forgiven for regarding as
superfluous, given the constitutional text. Insisting on evidence of an intent to give the treaty
domestic legal force is itself problematic in light of constitutional text purporting to do that
work. Treating the absence of such intent as evidence of an affirmative intent to require legislative action, leaving the president with less power to require compliance than if there had
been no treaty obligation to comply, would take the majority’s analysis into the realm of the
absurd.
III. AVOIDING ABSURDITY
Despite the language quoted above, there is substantial ground for rejecting a reading of
Medellı́n as requiring evidence that the treaty was intended to have the force of domestic law.
If such evidence were required, few, if any, treaties—and no multilateral treaties—would be
self-executing. States rarely, if ever, address a treaty’s status as domestic law in the treaty itself.53
Such a test would accordingly conflict with many, many Supreme Court decisions, stretching
back to the 1790s, that have applied unexecuted treaties,54 including decisions the majority in
49
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Id. For a sampling of other indications that the majority believed a treaty to be self-executing only if its text
affirmatively conveys an intent that it have the force of domestic law, see Medellı́n, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (“In sum, while
treaties ‘may comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on these
terms.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc))); id. at 1369; see also id. at 1364 (“[ W ]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions
indicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”); id. at 1366 (“Our cases
simply require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it
and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.”).
53
Accord Bradley, supra note 42.
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See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 –37 (1796), discussed in Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation
of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 8 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1621–22 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Safeguard of Nationalism]; see also Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 31, at 40 n.191 (citing other cases).
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Medellı́n purported not to disturb.55 The portions of the majority opinion purporting to
require affirmative evidence of an intent to give the treaty domestic legal force are thus in conflict with the portions of the same opinion recognizing that “some international agreements are
self-executing”56 and purporting not to disturb decisions enforcing treaties that lack “provisions clearly according [them] domestic effect.”57 Avoidance of the absurdities that would otherwise be produced by its Youngstown analysis is another reason to reject the test and to interpret
the opinion instead to regard treaties as non-self-executing only if they contain evidence of an
intent to require legislation. In the absence of such evidence, there would be no basis for placing
the president’s memorandum in Jackson’s third category.
Admittedly, the affirmative evidence the majority cited in support of its conclusion that
Article 94 contemplated implementing legislation was weak. First, the Court read the language
of Article 94 —“undertakes to comply”—as “confirm[ing] that further action to give effect to
an ICJ judgment was contemplated.”58 But, while the term “undertake” may, in colloquial
usage, suggest a soft, attenuated obligation, in international law, an “undertaking” is understood to be a hard, immediate obligation.59 Moreover, the need for “further action” does not
explain why that further action might not come from the president or even from the courts.
The majority also appeared to perceive a pertinent, though apparently inarticulable, similarity
between the “undertakes to comply” language in Article 94 and the “shall be ratified” language
in the treaty involved in Foster.60 It overlooked the fact that the Court in Percheman later concluded that this same language was consistent with self-execution.61 (Indeed, by ignoring the
Spanish version of the treaty, the Court repeated the error it committed in Foster, although this
time with its eyes wide open.)
As an additional reason for concluding that Article 94(1) was not automatically enforceable
in our courts, the majority also relied on “Article 94(2)—the enforcement provision—[which]
provides the sole remedy for noncompliance: referral to the United Nations Security Council
by an aggrieved state.”62 The Court noted that, because the United States retained a veto in
the Security Council, it was effectively immune from Security Council resolutions against it.
The veto made any purported obligation of the United States to comply with ICJ judgments
illusory. The United States always retained the option of “[n]oncompliance with an ICJ
judgment through exercise of the Security Council veto.”63 Because direct enforceability
would remove this “option” of noncompliance, the majority regarded Article 94(2) as
55

See Medellı́n, 128 S.Ct. at 1365– 66 (discussing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191, 196 (1961), and Clark
v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507–11, 517–18 (1947), and noting with approval that the Court had found self-executing
“a number of the ‘Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation’ Treaties cited by the dissent”).
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Id. at 1364.
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Id. at 1369.
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Id. at 1359 n.5.
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See Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 31, at 35 n.172.
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Medellı́n, 128 S.Ct. at 1358.
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words of contract, stipulating for some future legislative act; they are not necessarily so. They may import that they
‘shall be ratified and confirmed,’ by force of the instrument itself.” United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
51, 89 (1833).
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affirmative evidence that Article 94(1) was not intended to be directly enforceable in our
courts.64
This argument produces absurdities of its own, however. The veto is only relevant because
the UN Charter creates a formal international enforcement mechanism. For the nations holding the veto, it just makes that enforcement mechanism ineffective. Most treaties, however,
including many that the Court has found to be self-executing, include no formal international
enforcement mechanism at all. If a treaty that establishes an enforcement mechanism but gives
the United States a veto is non-self-executing because of the veto, then, a fortiori, a treaty that
does not establish an effective international enforcement mechanism would be non-self-executing. In other words, the majority’s analysis suggests that a treaty is self-executing only if it
creates a formal international enforcement mechanism that would be effective against the
United States. That, of course, has never been a requirement for self-execution.
In short, the majority’s reasons for concluding that Article 94 affirmatively reflects an intent
to require legislative implementation are unconvincing. Still, interpreting Medellı́n to rest on
a questionable construction of Article 94 would be preferable to interpreting it to establish that
treaties are self-executing only if they affirmatively indicate that they were intended to have the
force of domestic law. The latter would conflict with constitutional text, history, and longstanding Supreme Court precedent.65 The majority’s analysis of the presidential power issue—
specifically, its conclusion that the existence of a non-self-executing treaty places presidential
action in the third Youngstown category—provides additional support for the view that Medellı́n rests on a construction of Article 94(1) as affirmatively contemplating implementing legislation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority’s rejection of the president’s memorandum appears to have been based on its
countertextual view that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law and hence
require legislative action to acquire domestic legal force. As a result, its analysis of the presidential power issue has little to say about presidential action unrelated to non-self-executing
treaties. Ironically, the Court’s claim that the existence of a non-self-executing treaty on point
places presidential action in Youngstown’s third category provides some basis for rejecting the
majority’s highly problematic suggestion that a treaty is self-executing only if its text affirmatively indicates that it was intended to have the force of domestic law. The absence of such an
intent cannot be said to indicate that the Senate meant to require legislation. To rely on the
absence of such evidence, therefore, would be to treat ratified treaties as negative law. Avoiding
this absurd result should lead us to treat the opinion as having held that a treaty is self-executing
unless it affirmatively indicates that it was “ratified with the understanding that it is not to have
domestic effect of its own force.”66 So understood, the majority’s error was in finding that Article 94 reflected such an understanding.
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